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The Flint, Michigan Water Crisis: 
A Case Study of the United States’ Broken Water Regulation Laws 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
On April 25, 2014, the City of Flint, Michigan, switched its water supply source from Lake 
Huron to the Flint River.1 Less than a month later, Flint citizens noticed a difference in the odor, 
taste and color of their water, and that summer, began to congregate outside City Hall, wielding 
clear, plastic gallon jugs filled with brown, murky water, in order to protest the safety of the 
water from the Flint water system.2 It was obvious, just from the sickening, brownish tinge of the 
water sloshing around in the jugs, that there was a big problem with the water in Flint, and that 
something had to be done immediately. Nothing, however, was done immediately. The local, 
state, and federal governments did nothing in response to the Flint citizens’ pleas for help until 
almost two years later, and only after the issue had been investigated by private citizens and 
governmental failings had been largely exposed. In fact, the circumstances surrounding the Flint, 
Michigan Water Crisis suggest that government officials on every level concealed evidence of 
dangerous levels of lead in Flint water, and actively mislead the very people they were entrusted 
to protect. 
The water in Flint remains unsafe still. Flint’s infrastructure has been irreparably damaged by 
the corrosive water from the Flint River, which has leached lead and other contaminants out from 
 
1 Jennifer Dixon, How Flint’s Water Crisis Unfolded, Detroit Free Press, 
http://www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-water-crisis-timeline/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).  
2 Erik Kirkland, How the Flint Water Crisis Emerged, MLive, 
https://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/how_the_flint_water_crisis_eme.html#7 
(last visited Dec. 13, 2016); Arthur Delaney, Justice Department Opens Investigation into Toxic 
Tap Water in Flint, The Post News Group (Jan. 8, 2016, 11:45 p.m.), 
http://postnewsgroup.com/blog/2016/01/08/justice-department-opens-investigation-toxic-tap-
water-flint/. 
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the city’s pipes and caused faucet water in homes, businesses, and even hospitals to run an 
alarming shade of brown. Lead levels in drinking water in Flint homes has tested as high as 
thirteen thousand, two hundred parts per billion, over eight hundred and eighty times the 
national limit of what is considered safe, and over two times the level of lead in water that is 
considered hazardous waste.3 Flint citizens are advised to drink, cook, and take sponge baths 
using bottled water.4 They are told to use sink filters and at-home lead testing kits, which are 
donated by private citizens and organizations.5 When they absolutely have to take a shower, they 
are to use cold water only, and leave the shower door open, so as not create and ingest the toxic 
steam.6  
It shocks the conscience to consider that in 2016, United States citizens can be denied clean 
drinking water, the most basic of all human rights. Even more shocking is to think that the 
government, either through its incompetence or indifference, has somehow designed to conceal 
the fact of contaminated drinking water from the very people it is entrusted to protect. It is 
almost inconceivable to think that local, state and federal government actors in Flint, Michigan, 
and the United States could have ignored the pleas of angry citizens for almost two years, and 
acted only when their jobs were on the line. More shocking still is that various government 
officials have evaded culpability and are free to act so egregiously again.  
Indeed, it has become apparent that Flint is not the only city in the United States that has 
dangerous drinking water, and that the government’s inaction, ineptitude and indifference in 
 
3 Siddhartha Roy, Hazardous Waste-Levels of Lead Found in a Flint Household’s Water, Flint 
Water Study (Aug. 24, 2015), http://flintwaterstudy.org/2015/08/hazardous-waste-levels-of-lead-
found-in-a-flint-households-water/. 
4 Flint is STILL a Crisis, TYT Politics (Sept. 6, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVKsPIInU44&t=193s.  
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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Flint is not a one-off mistake. Public health catastrophes similar to that in Flint have occurred in 
the past, and water poisoned by lead continues to be an issue in the United States today. Not even 
a decade ago, in Washington, D.C., evidence of excessively high levels of lead in the water 
supply was exposed by private citizens, and concealed by the government for three years.7 More 
recently, in Newark, New Jersey, it was discovered students in thirty of public schools are being 
poisoned by drinking water that is thirty-five times the federal action level of fifteen parts per 
billion.8 It has been suggested, even, that the crisis in Flint is only the “tip of the iceberg” of 
water contamination issues in the United States, and that over five thousand water systems across 
the United States are in violation of federal law.9    
All levels of government, federal, state and local, are to blame for what happened in Flint. All 
parties involved are guilty of miscommunication, inaction, indifference, self-interest, and even 
fraud. It is clear, then, that a proper fix for the Flint, Michigan water crisis will take much more 
than the replacement of infrastructure. In order to achieve a lasting change in Flint and to correct 
and prevent instances of toxic water elsewhere in the United States, the structure of water 
regulation laws in the United States must be fundamentally changed at their core.  
II. The Flint, Michigan Water Crisis  
 
 
7 Arthur Delaney & Philip Lewis, How the Federal Government Botched Flint’s Water Crisis, 
The Huffington Post, (Jan 12, 2016, 3:20 p.m.), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/flint-lead-
water-epa_us_569522a8e4b086bc1cd5373c.  
8 Jessica Mazzola, Lead in Newark Schools’ Water Dates Back to at Least 2012, NJ.com, (Mar. 
16, 2016, 7:37 p.m.), 
http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2016/03/lead_in_newark_schools_water_dates_back_to_at_le
as.html.  
9 Erik Olson & Kristi Pullen Fedinick, Report: What’s in Your Water? Flint and Beyond: 
Analysis of EPA Data Reveals Widespread Lead Crisis Potentially Affecting Millions of 
Americans, NRDC, (Jun. 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/whats-in-your-water-
flint-beyond-report.pdf. 
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Flint, Michigan, located seventy miles north of Detroit, was once a bustling city.10 Home to 
the largest General Motors plant, its residents had jobs, incomes, and, most importantly, access 
to clean water.11 For forty-seven years, the city of Flint purchased its supply of water from the 
Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (“DWSD”), which draws pre-treated water from the 
Lake Huron.12 By the late 1980s, however, a financial depression hit Flint, and by 2011, Flint 
had reached a $25.7 million deficit, with approximately 40% of its population living beneath the 
poverty line.13 As such, in November 2012, the City of Flint came under State management, 
pursuant to Michigan’s Emergency Manager Law, which allows for the appointment of an 
“Emergency Manager” to unilaterally make decisions during a state of financial emergency.14 
Flint’s first Emergency Manager, Darnell Earley, decided to switch the water systems for Flint 
from the DWSD to the Karegondi Water Authority (“KWA”), which also draws from Lake 
Huron.15 The switch would save the city millions, but would take time, as the KWA lines would 
not be completed until 2016.16 In the two years before the switch would be complete, the City of 
Flint, the Genesee County Drain Commission and the Michigan Department of Environmental 
Quality (“MDEQ”) agreed to use a water system drawing from the Flint River.17 
 
10 QuickFacts: Flint City, Michigan, United States Census Bureau, 
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/2629000 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
11 Flint, Michigan, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flint,_Michigan (last modified Dec. 
13, 2016, 10:36 p.m.). 
12 Id.  
13 Roger Fraser, Laura Argyle, Gene Dennis, Darnell Earley, Robert L. Emerson, Frederick 
Headen, Doug Ringler & Brom Stibitz, Report of the Flint Financial Review Team, State of 
Michigan Department of Treasury, (Nov, 7, 2011), 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Flint-ReviewTeamReport-11-7-
11_417437_7.pdf. 
14 Dixon, supra note 1.  
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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The water from the Flint River was, as it was later discovered, extremely corrosive.18 
Although the EPA’s Lead and Copper Rule requires that corrosion control treatment, the addition 
of phosphates to the water system, be applied to water systems serving over 100,000 users, as 
was the case in Flint, the City of Flint never administered the quality control measure, and the 
MDEQ never required the city to do so.19 Instead, the MDEQ ordered the city to begin two, six-
month long rounds of testing of the water in order to determine whether the corrosion control 
was necessary, a quality control measure that is only appropriate for water systems serving fewer 
than 50,000 people.20 As a result, the corrosive Flint water leached the lead and other 
contaminants from the aging service lines delivering water from the river and into businesses and 
homes, causing the water in faucets and showers to run a disturbing shade of brown.21 Flint 
residents noticed the change in the water within weeks and immediately voiced their concerns.22 
Responses to citizens’ complaints were minor and ineffective. In August and September of 
2014, the City issued boil-water advisories because of e-coli bacteria in the water, and treated the 
water by administering a chlorine disinfectant.23 On January 2, 2015, the city issued a warning 
that total trihalomethanes (TTHMS), byproducts of water-disinfectant chemicals, exceeded 
federal limits, but assured that the water was still safe to consume for those who were not sick or 
elderly.24 By that time, General Motors had already announced that it planned to discontinue the 
use of Flint River water in its engine plant because new parts had begun to corrode.25 Likewise, 
 
18 Id. 
19 Noah Hall, The Flint Drinking Water Crisis – First Thoughts and a Legal Overview, Great 
Lakes Law, (Jan. 24, 2016), http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/blog/flint-water-crisis/.  
20 Id. 
21 Kirkland, supra note 2.  
22 Id. 
23 Dixon, supra note 1. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
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the State Department of Technology, Management had begun to provide water coolers on each 
floor of its offices so that state workers would not have to drink from water fountains. Still, the 
city maintained that the water was safe to drink.26 On January 6, Flint Mayor Dayne Walling 
held a news conference and assured that the water was safe to drink, and that despite the boil 
advisories, he and his family used it every day. 27 In response to mounting concerns, an officer 
from the DWSD wrote to the Emergency Manager, Darnell Earley, on January 12, 2015, and 
offered to reconnect the city of Flint to its water system at no extra cost to Flint, if the city would 
only make a long-term agreement to use water supplied by the company.28 Earley refused.29 
Exposure and Government Concealment   
In the face of government inaction, it fell upon private citizens and private organizations to 
expose and attempt to combat the lead contamination in the water in Flint. Flint residents 
complained about their water with a renewed vigor, staging protests and turning up to town hall 
meetings to complain of their lead-poisoning-related symptoms.30 The University of Michigan-
Flint started testing the water fountains in its buildings for lead, and on January 9, 2015, and 
found elevated levels of lead in drinking fountains in two of its buildings. After her four-year-old 
son developed a rash covering his entire body, Flint resident LeeAnne Walters appeared before 
the Flint City Council on February 4, 2015, and demanded that the City of Flint test her home for 
 
26 Kim Bellware, State Gave its Workers in Flint Clean Water as it Assured Residents Taps Were 
Safe, The Huffington Post (Jan 28, 2016, 9:19 p.m.), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/flint-
government-water-coolers_us_56aaa4a5e4b077d4fe8d8135. 
27 Ron Fonger, Flint Officials Say City on Track to Address Disinfection Byproduct in Drinking 
Water, MLive, (Jan. 6, 2015, 5:43 p.m.), 
http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/flint_officials_say_city_on_ri.html. 
 
28 Dixon, supra note 1. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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lead.31 The test revealed that her tap water contained lead levels of one hundred and four parts 
per billion, six times the fifteen parts per billion safety threshold of the EPA.32 A follow-up test 
done by a city official one week later came back with a lead level of a staggering three hundred 
and ninety seven parts per billion, over twenty-six times the federal limit.33 
Alarmed by the levels of lead in the water in her home, Walters contacted the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) on February 25, 2015.34 Miguel Del Toral, Regulations Manager for 
Region Five of the EPA, acknowledged the alarming amount of lead found in the Flint water, 
and reached out to the MDEQ on March 9, 2015 to express his concern.35 After initially claiming 
that Flint had an “optimized” corrosion control program, MDEQ agent Stephen Busch finally 
admitted to the EPA on April 24, 2015, that there was no corrosion control in Flint, but that the 
MDEQ was monitoring the lead levels in the water, and that the results indicated that no 
additional corrosion control was needed.36 Del Toral drafted an internal memo to the EPA which 
detailed the hazardous level of lead in Walter’s home, and questioned the lack of corrosion 
control in Flint. In the memo, he explained,  
A major concern from a public health standpoint is the absence of 
corrosion control treatment in the City of Flint for mitigating lead 
and copper levels in the drinking water. […] Recent drinking water 
sample results indicate the presence of high lead results in the 
drinking water, which is to be expected in a public water system 
that is not providing corrosion control treatment. […] The lack of 
any mitigating treatment for lead is of serious concern for residents 
 
31 Id. 
32 Lindsey Smith, This Mom Helped Uncover What Was Really Going on with Flint’s Water, 
Michigan Radio, (Dec. 14, 2015), http://michiganradio.org/post/mom-helped-uncover-what-was-
really-going-flint-s-water. 
33 Id. 
34 Dixon, supra note 1. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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that live in homes with lead service lines or partial lead service 
lines, which are common throughout the City of Flint.37 
 
Del Toral went on to explain how the levels of lead which had been reported to citizens were 
likely also inaccurate, because the City of Flint had been engaging in the practice of “pre-
flushing” the pipes before testing them for lead, which significantly lowered the lead levels that 
showed up in the samples collected.38 The memo claimed that this issue of inaccurate reporting 
was raised with the MDEQ, however, the MDEQ “has indicated that this practice is not 
prohibited by the LCR and continues to retain the ‘pre-flushing’ recommendation in their lead 
compliance sampling guidance to public water systems in Michigan.”39 Del Toral’s supervisors 
declined to publish his report, calling it “premature”.40 Despite this, the report eventually was 
made public after Del Toral gave a copy to LeeAnne Walters, who forwarded it in July of 2015 
to the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”).41 In response to new public concerns, MDEQ 
spokesperson Brad Wurfel assured that “anyone who is concerned about lead in the drinking 
water in Flint can relax.”42 
LeeAnne Walters also reached out to Dr. Marc Edwards, professor of environmental 
engineering at Virginia Tech, who had, a decade prior, helped to expose a toxic level of lead in 
drinking water in Washington, D.C. 43 Dr. Edwards and his team initiated an independent study 
into the lead levels in homes in Flint. He tested the home of LeeAnne Walters without first 
 
37 Miguel Del Toral, High Lead Levels in Flint, Michigan – Interim Report, United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, Region 5, (Jun. 24, 2015), 
https://www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/Original%20EPA%20memo.%20062514.pdf. 
 
38 Id. 
39Id. 
40 Dixon, supra note 1. 
41 Delaney, supra note 7. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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flushing out the pipes, and found an astounding lead level of thirteen thousand, two hundred 
parts per billion, almost three times the 5,000 part per billion lead level at which water is 
considered to be hazardous waste.44 Over the course of several months, Edwards tested over 
three hundred more homes in Flint and continued to find staggering levels of lead.45 He, like Del 
Toral, confirmed that the EPA regularly “cheats the system” in order to avoid detecting 
impermissibly high levels of lead in communities’ drinking water by “selectively testing homes 
that are unlikely to have high levels of lead, by asking residents to ‘pre-flush’ their taps, and 
taking water samples ‘slowly’, which reduces lead levels.” 46 
  Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha also played a crucial role in exposing the severity of the 
problems being caused by the water contaminated by lead. After hearing about complaints by 
parents that their children were suffering from symptoms potentially related to their drinking 
water, Dr. Hanna-Attisha, director of the Pediatric Residency Program at Hurley Medical Center, 
a public hospital in Flint, began independently testing children in Flint for lead poisoning.47 Dr. 
Hanna-Attisha, as doctor and a hospital administrator, was in a unique position to access and 
interpret the records of lead levels in the blood of Flint children, and went public with her results 
in September of 2015.48 Her tests revealed that lead levels in the blood of Flint children under the 
 
44 Roy, supra note 3. 
45 Id. 
46 Sara Ganim, 5,300 U.S. Water Systems are in Violation of Lead Rules, CNN (Jun. 29, 2016, 
6:50 a.m.), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/28/us/epa-lead-in-u-s-water-systems/. 
47 Dr. Sanjay Gupta, Ben Tinker & Tim Hume, ‘Our Mouths Were Ajar’: Doctor’s Fight to 
Expose Flint’s Water Crisis, CNN (Jan. 22, 2016, 8:25 a.m.), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/21/health/flint-water-mona-hanna-attish/. 
48 Mona Hanna-Attisha, MD, Jenny LaChance, MS, Richard Casey Sadler, PhD, & Allison 
Champney Schnepp, MD, Elevated Blood Lead Levels in Children Associated With the Flint 
Drinking Water Crisis: A Spatial Analysis of Risk and Public Health Response, AJPH Research, 
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2015.303003 (accepted Nov. 21, 2015). 
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age of five had doubled and in some cases tripled after the water had been switched.49 In 
response to her research, Spokesperson for the MDEQ, Brad Wurfel, labeled Hanna-Attisha an 
“unfortunate researcher” in an attempt to discredit her findings.50 Much later, when the CDC 
finally confirmed her findings, Dr. Hanna-Attisha lamented the whole experience, saying that it 
“shattered” her trust in the government.51 “It’s not that I was naive to start with,” she reflected, 
“but you’d expect that utilities, states, federal agencies would take their jobs seriously and try to 
protect people rather than deliberately mislead, lie and make up excuses not to protect public 
health.”52 
III. Health Effects of Lead Poisoning 
 
The CDC confirmed the findings of Dr. Hanna-Attisha that approximately eight thousand 
Flint children under the age of six had suffered from elevated lead levels in their blood as a result 
of drinking Flint water.53 As Documentary Filmmaker and Flint native Michael Moore pointed 
out in an interview with MSNBC, eight thousand is the entire population of children under the 
age of six in Flint.54 Every Flint child under six has been poisoned by lead.55 While the CDC test 
revealed that the risk level of having dangerously elevated blood lead levels in children who 
ingested Flint water has increased by fifty percent, the effects of the lead exposure on these eight 
 
49 Gupta, supra note 47. 
50 Delaney, supra note 7. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Maggie Fox, CDC Confirms Lead Levels Shot Up in Flint Kids After Water Switch, NBC 
News (Jun. 24, 2016, 1:34 p.m.), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/flint-water-crisis/cdc-
confirms-lead-levels-shot-flint-kids-after-water-switch-n598496. 
 
54 Michael Moore on the Flint Water Crisis, MRNBC (Jan. 20, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hSLL_lRNE8 [hereinafter Moore]. 
55 Id.  
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thousand children and on all the citizens of Flint have not yet been fully tested, and are, to a large 
degree, still unknown.56  
Pediatricians agree that lead poisoning has especially devastating effects on young children.57 
Exposure to lead of young children can lead to rashes, irritability, loss of appetite, weight loss, 
vomiting, abdominal pain, constipation, hearing loss and seizures, amongst other side effects.58 It 
can also lead to long-term health issues such as stunted growth, learning disabilities, behavioral 
and emotional problems, Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (“ADHD”) and a lowered IQ.59 
These consequences are permanent to developing brains. The World Health Organization 
(WHO) has noted that “because the human brain has little capacity for repair, these effects are 
untreatable and irreversible. They cause diminution in brain function and reduction in 
achievement that last throughout life.”60 Indeed, research has shown that “children with serious 
lead-related brain impacts are less likely to graduate from high school and more prone to 
delinquency, teen pregnancy, violent crime and incarceration.”61 
Lead poisoning also poses a significant risk for adults, older children, pregnant woman and 
unborn babies. Adults who suffer from lead exposure may experience cardiovascular and kidney 
disease, cognitive dysfunction, and elevated blood pressure.62 “High levels of lead can also affect 
a mature brain and, in very high doses, can kill.”63 Even in older children, lead exposure has 
 
56 Fox, supra note 16.  
57 Id. 
58 Lead Poisoning: Symptoms and Causes, Mayo Clinic (Dec. 6, 2016), 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/lead-poisoning/symptoms-causes/dxc-20275054.  
59 Lead Levels Linked to Lower IQ in Children, ABC News (June 2, 2016), 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/AmericanFamily/story?id=125121&page=1.  
60 Olson, supra note 9, at 3. 
61 Id. 
62 Olson, supra note 9, at 3. 
63 Fox, supra note 16. 
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been linked to delinquency, criminal behaviors, and conduct disorders.64 One Flint mother 
attested to a change in behavior in her seven-year-old son and sixteen-year-old daughter, which 
she believes was a result of their ingesting the toxic Flint water.65 After both of her children 
tested positive for elevated blood lead levels, Nakiya Wakes was dismayed to find that her 
daughter had become “more aggressive”, and that her son, who had been previously been 
suspended from school one time in one year, jumped to having being suspended fifty-six times 
the next year from the same school.66 Wakes also suffered a miscarriage of twins, which she 
suspects is connected to the lead exposure.67 “As the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) notes, ‘Even low-level lead exposures in developing babies have been found to affect 
behavior and intelligence. Lead exposure can cause miscarriage, stillbirths, and infertility (in 
both men and women).’”68 
Lead poisoning has also been linked to a possible outbreak of Legionnaires’ Disease, a 
potentially fatal respiratory disease caused by the Legionella bacteria.69 While the link between 
the Flint water and Legionnaires’ Disease has not been confirmed, it has been suggested that the 
corrosive Flint water created a condition which stimulated the growth of the Legionella 
bacteria.70 This theory would seem to be confirmed by the sharp rise of cases in Legionnaires’ 
Disease in Flint. In Genesee County, consisting of Flint and its neighboring towns, only six to 
 
64 Id. 
65 Mallory Simon & Sara Sidner, Flint Water Crisis: Families from ‘Manmade Disaster’, CNN 
Health (Mar. 5, 2016, 8:33 a.m.), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/03/health/water-crisis-flint-
michigan/ 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Olson, supra note 9, at 9. 
69 Janet Pelley, Legionnaires’ Outbreaks in Flint Linked to Corrosive Tap Water, C&EN (Jul. 25, 
2016), http://cen.acs.org/articles/94/web/2016/07/Legionnairesoutbreaks-Flint-linked-corrosive-
tap.html. 
70 Id. 
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thirteen cases of Legionnaires’ disease had been reported in the several years preceding the water 
source switch.71 In 2014, however, this number rose to ninety-one cases of Legionnaires’ Disease 
in Genesee County. Out of these ninety-one cases, there have been twelve fatalities.72 
IV. The Parties Responsible  
“The Flint water crisis is a story of government failure, intransigence, unpreparedness, delay, 
inaction, and environmental injustice.”73 The crisis in Flint could have been wholly avoided had 
the proper corrosion-control treatment been administered to the Flint River. Certainly, it could 
have been better corrected or at least dealt with had the appropriate authorities accepted 
responsibility and acted proactively to protect the citizens of Flint. In 2016, Michigan Governor 
Rick Snyder commissioned a group of individuals to assemble into the Flint Water Advisory 
Task Force and assess the situation in Flint.74 The task force analyzed the parties at fault and the 
causes for the government’s failure, and recommended ways to prevent future failures and ways 
to address the community’s immediate concerns.75 The task force ascribed blame to all levels of 
government involved, including the Federal Government through its Environmental Protection 
Agency, the State of Michigan’s Department of Environmental Quality and Governor’s Office, 
and the City of Flint.76 
a. Federal Government 
 
71 Elisha Anderson, Legionnaires’-Associated Deaths Grow to 12 in Flint Area, Detroit Free 
Press (Apr. 11, 2016, 6:59 p.m.), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/04/11/legionnaires-deaths-flint-water/82897722/.  
72 Id. 
73 Matthew M. Davis, MD, MAPP, Chris Kolb, Lawrence Reynolds, MD, Eric Rothstein, CPA, 
Ken Sikkema, Flint Water Advisory Task Force Report (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=http://flintwaterstudy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Flint-task-force-report_2438442_ver1.0.pdf&hl=en_US 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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“Though MDEQ was delegated primacy (authority to enforce federal law), the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) delayed enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA) and the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR), thereby prolonging the calamity.”77 The EPA 
was certainly and undeniably put on notice as to the crisis in Flint in February, 2015 through 
LeeAnne Walter’s communications with Miguel Del Toral.78 Del Toral reached out to the 
MDEQ that same month, and the MDEQ finally admitted to not using any corrosion control.79 
He notified the EPA of the issue, but was silenced by his superiors, who actively concealed his 
damning report until it was leaked to the public.80 Even still, the EPA denied culpability, 
claiming that it was given inaccurate information from state and city officials, and so it failed to 
take action until January of 2016, only after President Obama declared Flint to be in a state of 
emergency.81  
The EPA failed in its responsibility to enforce the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SWDA”) and 
the Lead and Copper Rule (“LCR”).82 The SWDA was enacted by Congress as a way to establish 
a national public health standard for water supply systems and to allow the federal government to 
regulate contaminants in public drinking water.83 Under the SWDA, the EPA is required to set 
the national limit for dangerous contaminants.84 For lead, the national limit of what is considered 
‘safe’ is fifteen parts per billion. Under the authority of the SWDA, the EPA enacted the Lead 
and Copper Rule (LCR), which requires that operators of municipal water systems regularly 
monitor, treat, and report lead and copper levels in water to ensure that they are below the nation 
 
77 Id.  
78 Dixon, supra note 1. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Davis, supra note 73. 
83 Safe Drinking Water Act (SWDA), https://www.epa.gov/sdwa, (last updated Sept. 27, 2016). 
84 Id. 
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level of what is considered safe.85 To this day, the EPA has failed to cite Flint as having violated 
the LCR.86 
b. State Government  
“The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) failed in its fundamental 
responsibility to effectively enforce drinking water regulations.”87 The MDEQ is responsible for 
the initial enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act. States are required under the Act to have 
water regulations that are at least as stringent of those of the EPA, and must agree to provide safe 
drinking water to citizens in emergencies.88 The MDEQ directly violated the SDWA by failing to 
require the City of Flint to apply corrosion control agents to the Flint River, thereby directly 
causing the crisis in Flint.89  “The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services 
(MDHHS) failed to adequately and promptly act to protect public health.”90 Along with the 
MDEQ, the MDHHS attempted to silence the complaints of Flint Citizens and “worked to 
discredit” the attempts of others, including Dr. Mona Hanna-Attish, to attempt to bring the issue 
of unsafe water into the public eye.91 Finally, “neither the Governor nor the Governor’s office 
took steps to reverse poor decisions by MDEQ and state-appointed emergency managers until 
October 2015, in spite of mounting problems and suggestions to do so by senior staff members in 
the Governor’s office.”92 
c. Local Government  
 
85 Id. 
86 Davis, supra note 73. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id.  
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“With the city of Flint under emergency management, the Flint Water Department rushed 
unprepared into full-time operation of the Flint Water Treatment Plant, drawing water from a 
highly corrosive source without the use of corrosion control.”93 Although acting on the orders of 
the MDEQ, the City of Flint still had an obligation, as the governmental representatives closest 
in line to the people of Flint, to attempt to apply corrosion control in compliance with federal law 
and to attempt to address the health concerns brought by their neighbors and friends in Flint.94 
Regardless of whether City officials were acting on the orders of the MDEQ, the way they tested 
for water, by obtaining samples from low-risk homes and pre-flushing pipes, was manifestly 
unethical.  Someone, somewhere along the line, should have stepped up and reported this. 
d. Michigan’s Emergency Manager Law  
In addition to the numerous failures by federal, state and local authorities, critics have 
largely agreed that the Flint water crisis was started, at its most fundamental point, by 
Michigan’s Emergency Manager Law. The controversial law was originally passed in 1988, and 
was amended in 2012. The law allows, when a city is declared to be in a state of financial crisis, 
for an Emergency manager to come in and unilaterally make decisions that would benefit the 
city’s financial situation. The controversial law has been criticized as unconstitutional, 
effectively allowing one person to replace a representative government.95 The law has been 
widely criticized for displacing democratic government and imposing an unconstitutional, 
unilateral system of governance.  
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V. Short-Term Solutions for Flint   
Many short-term solutions have been proposed to remedy the crisis in Flint. Governor 
Snyder, through his task force, has made a series of recommendations to ensure the safety of the 
Flint community.96 It is without question that the safety of the people in Flint should be most 
immediate and important concern. Since the crisis has received national attention, various private 
organizations and citizens have made donations of bottled water, at-home lead testing kits, and 
other commodities. A fund has been set up by Dr.  Mona Hanna-Attisha to provide for the 
children of Flint who have already faced irreparable damage from the exposure to lead. Millions 
of dollars have been allocated by the state and federal government to help the situation in Flint, 
which has been declared by president Obama to be in a federal state of emergency. Various 
engineering innovations have been proposed in order to create a more sturdy, viable 
infrastructure to replace the ageing pipes that have been corroded by the Flint River.  
While it is axiomatic that the infrastructure in Flint must immediately be replaced, Dr. Marc 
Edwards has estimated that replacing the city-owned pipes in Flint would cost around 1.5 billion 
dollars, and the process would take approximately thirty years to complete.97 While the problem 
in Flint can only be immediately fixed by spending money and time toward updates to 
infrastructure, the crisis of water contamination in the United States cannot be addressed in full 
unless it is addressed at its root. The disaster in Flint is the result of a failure on all levels of 
government to properly regulate the city’s water and then to properly respond to the disaster 
once it had been revealed. It is the result of a lack of communication and cooperation between 
levels of government due to a lack of clear, distinguished federal laws.  
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VI. Poorly Defined Roles and Lack of Accountability   
The United States’ laws governing water regulation are ambiguous, poorly defined, and, as 
shown by the governmental responses to accusations of wrongdoing, open to interpretation. Each 
governmental agency accused of causing or exacerbating the contaminated water crisis in Flint 
has taken advantage of the lack of clearly defined roles in water regulation laws and attempted to 
shift blame from itself and onto another. In his January 19, 2015 State of the State address, 
Michigan Governor Rick Snyder promised that all involved in the Flint water crisis would be 
held accountable.98 Ironically, Snyder himself was implicated by his own task force for 
contributing to the disaster, and many Flint citizens have called for Snyder’s resignation and 
incarceration.99 MDEQ director Dan Wyat’s a long-overdue admission of guilt on October 19, 
2016 was quickly followed by a finger pointed at the EPA. He declared, "It recently has become 
clear that our drinking water program staff made a mistake while working with the city of Flint 
[…] Simply stated, staff employed a federal protocol they believed was appropriate, and it was 
not."100 
The EPA has similarly attempted to relieve itself of the responsibility in Flint and place the 
blame on the State government.  In response to the public outrage against the EPA for its delay 
in responding to the Flint crisis after it was revealed by Del Toral’s leaked memo, Susan 
Hedman, director of Region Five, explained that information about the crisis was not released 
sooner because Del Toral’s report was simply “premature.”101 The EPA, she explained, had 
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elected to wait for a legal opinion before taking action in Flint.102 This legal opinion, which 
would not have been ready until November of 2015, would have contained information as to 
whether the EPA had the legal authority to force the State of Michigan and the MDEQ to act in 
response to the water crisis.103 Susan Hedman has since resigned from the EPA.104 
In January of 2016, The EPA released a statement blaming its failure to act on the local 
government in Flint and the Michigan State Government and its agencies, who it accused of 
failing to be forthright and transparent with its reports to the EPA.105 Likewise, after the EPA 
was exposed in June, 2016 for failing to respond to several cases of lead contamination across 
the United States, an EPA spokesperson responded with a statement that it is the states “who are 
responsible for and do take the majority of the drinking water enforcement actions and are the 
first line of oversight of drinking water systems.”106 Senator and then-presidential candidate 
Marco Rubio was asked in early 2016 by a MSNBC reporter for his stance on the situation in 
Flint.107 Rubio responded that although he was not fully briefed on the situation, it was his 
understanding that the federal government had no significant regulatory role to play in the water 
crisis in Flint.108 
The poorly-defined water regulation laws and the resulting blame-game played by all of 
those involved in the Flint water contamination crisis all but guarantees that total accountability 
will not be achieved and that such a disaster could easily happen again. Indeed, environmental 
activist Erin Brockovich has suggested that the crisis in Flint is just “the tip of the iceberg” for 
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water contamination issues in the United States. On June 28, 2016, The Natural Resources and 
Defense Counsel (“NRDC”) released a report stating that 5,363 water systems in the United 
States violate the EPA’s Lead and Copper Rule, and that an estimated 18 million people in the 
United States live in communities that are served by water that falls short of federal safety 
regulations.109 Violations of the Lead and Copper Rule included “failures to properly test the 
water for lead or contaminants that could result in lead contamination, failures to report 
contamination to state officials or to the public, and failures to treat the water appropriately to 
reduce corrosion.” 1,110 out of these systems provided water that exceeded lead levels of 15 
parts per billion to over 3.9 million people.  
Moreover, the NRDC reported that the EPA knows about these instances of dangerous lead 
levels in water, but in many cases has done nothing to rectify the issues. Looking at the EPA’s 
own data, it found that formal enforcement action was taken against a mere 11.2 percent of the 
8,000 violations that occurred in 2015. Penalties were even more sparse, and were sought in only 
3 percent of the 8,000 violations in 2016. Even worse, the EPA has admitted that its analyses and 
assessments of drinking water are “substantially incomplete.” The NRDC report contends that 
the EPA “failed to act, downplayed the problem, and emboldened the actions of some water 
systems of primacy agencies”, and posits that “as long as we have this culture of hiding 
violations and attacking staff members who do their jobs, more Flints can be expected.”  
VII. Disturbing Pattern of Government Inaction   
The government’s poor response to lead contamination has displayed itself in many other 
instances. The NRDC report references an incident of lead contamination that was discovered in 
Washington, D.C. in 2001, largely by the same Dr. Marc Edwards who was involved in exposing 
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the lead contamination in Flint. In 2001, Edwards conducted a study that found that lead levels 
were over eighty-three times higher than the EPA’s limit. While it was alleged that the EPA and 
the D.C. Water and Sewer Authority knew of these high lead levels since 2002, this was never 
acknowledged to the public until 2004, when the contamination was exposed by an investigation 
by the Washington Post. 110 In a series of publications, the newspaper accused the EPA of 
misrepresenting lead levels, as well as being slow to force states to collect and report required 
data on lead levels in drinking water. In response, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(“CDC”) published a report which claimed that the blood lead levels of the 201 residents whose 
homes tested high for lead were all below the level at which the government would be 
concerned.111 In a similar effort to cover up any wrongdoing, the EPA removed from its website 
warnings that lead levels above 40 parts per billion were a serious concern to pregnant women 
and children. 112 Dr. Edwards was able to debunk the claims of the CDC and the EPA by 
obtaining data on blood lead levels from a local hospital, after his request for information under 
the Freedom of Information Act was denied. Edwards said of the experience, “In D.C., I learned 
that you can’t trust your kids with a government agency.”113 
On March 9, 2016, thirty schools in Newark, New Jersey, were found to have been 
supplying their students with water that was thirty-five times the federal action level of fifteen 
parts per billion. 114 Tests done by the State Department of Environmental Protection of three 
hundred school buildings in Newark revealed that fifty-nine of them were using water 
contaminated by lead. Although further studies are required to assess the situation, it has been 
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alleged by the Newark School Board the that district has known about elevated lead levels in 
students’ drinking water since 2004. The water fountains in the affected schools have since been 
turned off and children are provided bottled water to drink at school. Despite this, over three 
thousand children have tested positive for lead poisoning in New Jersey last year, and results 
have shown that children in eleven New Jersey towns, including Newark, “have a higher 
proportion of dangerous lead levels than Flint.” 115 
VIII. Viable Long-Term Solutions  
It is indisputable that local, state and federal governments in the United States have 
repeatedly and systematically failed in their responses to toxic lead levels in the drinking water 
of United States citizens. The fact that every level of government, every agency that could be 
held responsible, has attempted and, in many cases, has managed to shift blame off themselves 
and onto one another, all but ensures this dangerous pattern is likely continuing to this day and 
will continue in the future.  For this reason, it is imperative that structural changes be made to 
water regulation laws in the United States.  
The National Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”), a non-profit environmental 
advocacy group, has suggested that in order for a crisis like Flint to be prevented in the future, 
both the Lead and Copper Rule of the EPA and the Safe Drinking Water Act must each be 
completely reworked.116 In a June, 2016 report, the NRDC pointed out that the Lead and Copper 
Rule of contains “weak language, implementation, and enforcement.”117 Importantly, the Rule 
includes no specific provision making it mandatory for the EPA to alert the citizens of lead in 
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their drinking water.118 Under the current law, the EPA has technically committed no legal 
wrongdoing by keeping the information about the lead contamination in Flint private, as the 
responsibility for notification under the current structure of the law lies at the state and local 
level.119 As such, the NRDC has suggested amending the federal rules to “(1) require the full 
replacement of all lead service lines; (2) more fully and fairly monitor lead levels, and prohibit 
water systems from using testing strategies that circumvent the detection or reporting of lead 
contamination; and (3) require clear, ongoing, timely, and culturally appropriate public education 
and notification of lead problems.”120 
Furthermore, the NRDC has proposed that changes be made to the Safe Drinking Water 
Act as well. The SDWA is largely unenforceable, due to its “poor funding, lack of management 
support, and bureaucratic indifference or fear of recrimination by the EPA.”121 Bi-partisan 
influences have created a substantial barrier blocking reforms of federal water regulation laws.122 
The EPA is consistently attacked by the Republican Congress, which views water regulation as a 
traditionally state-led issue and dislikes when federal agencies overstep their bounds.123 For real 
change to be made, it is necessary for Congress to curb its criticism of the EPA and to 
acknowledge that it is within the EPA’s jurisdiction to enforce the Safe Drinking Water Act.124  
Finally, the NRDC suggests that a “cultural change” must be integrated into the EPA and 
in other regulatory agencies who tried to conceal the crisis.125 When Del Toral exposed the crisis, 
he was labeled a “whistleblower” and a “rogue employee” by the EPA, after the agency failed in 
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its attempts to suppress his report.126 Similarly, Brad Wurfel, the spokesperson for the MDEQ 
attempted to downplay the crisis and discredit the findings of Dr. Hanna-Attisha.127 While a 
change in the way the agencies operate is a noble goal, this remedy is perhaps a bit less practical 
than the others suggested by the NDRC. Instituting a “culture change” in a federal agency is a 
nebulous concept. In this context, would seem to be a virtual impossibility, given the 
egregiousness of the behavior of all the parties involved. Attempting to “change” the way that 
federal, state and even local officials operate would probably be as difficult as trying to change 
the instinctual human tendency to protect oneself over the needs of others. The goal should 
instead be to allow for the criminal enforcement of wrongdoers. While the NDRC posits that 
criminal enforcement will not be sufficient to bring about needed change to the agencies 
responsible for the crisis in Flint, perhaps it is the essential first step toward a so-called “culture 
change.”128 
IX.  Conclusion  
The Crisis in Flint, Michigan, is one of the most horrendous examples of the United States 
government failing its people. There is no easy solution to the problem in Flint, because the 
problem in Flint goes beyond a simple mistake of failing to add phosphates to a water system 
and then a subsequent series of mistakes in failing to correct the original mistake. What 
happened in Flint was caused by an abuse of power by those in power in all levels of 
government, and a callous disregard by those powerful people for the people they are supposed 
to protect. The actions of those responsible for the crisis were motivated by greed and self-
preservation; by the desire to escape blame overcoming the desire to help those in need by taking 
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responsibility and correcting the problem. There is no guarantee that restructuring United States’ 
water regulation laws will prevent something like Flint from ever happening again. There is no 
guarantee that entrusting more power to the EPA, the same agency which flagrantly flouted its 
power in Flint, will ensure that all people in the United States will have safe water to drink. 
Hopefully, at the very least, clarifying the United States water regulation laws will ensure 
accountability, and prevent government officials from “getting away” with the crime of 
poisoning its people. Certainly, the bravery and tenacity of the of citizens of Flint and all others 
who exposed the disaster suggests that, should another Flint happen in the future, it will not be 
tolerated and accountability will be held. 
 
